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In this paper we analyse price transmission for the carrot, parsley, tomato, green pepper and 
potato markets. Although there is a dual farm structure dominated by small individual farms, our re-
sults imply that price information ﬂ  ows from the producer to the retail level for potatoes, parsley and 
carrots. Our results also suggest that farmers do not merely accept prices, but can actually inﬂ  uence 
market prices. Tomato and green pepper prices have large transmission elasticities, and causality runs 
from the retail to producer level. It therefore follows that tomato and green pepper producers tend to 
accept prices and that the sector’s prices are determined by upper market levels (processors, wholesal-
ers, retailers). These results are reinforced by the fact that vegetable producers sell a large share of their 
production through procurement and processing, and therefore are more dependent on the upstream 
industries, and thus cannot inﬂ  uence prices. For all vegetables in this study the short-run price transmis-
sion is symmetric while on the tomato market the long-run price transmission is asymmetric. Results 
indicate that the tomato market is not competitive and efﬁ  cient; therefore processors, wholesalers, and 
retailers are capable of exercising market power, and can instantly transmit producer price increases 
while just slowly and partially transmitting producer price decreases. 
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1. Introduction
Two methods are widely used to study how food markets function and to determine 
the degree of competition in these same markets. These entail measuring the spread in verti-
cal price relationships and analysing the nature of price transmission along the supply chain 
from the producer to consumer. 
Asymmetric price transmission has been studied by numerous authors using different 
econometric methods. Wolffram (1971) and Houck (1977) used classical methods. Von Cramon-
Taubadel (1998) used speciﬁ  cation to cointegration methods and Goodwine and Harper 
(2000) used threshold autoregressive models However, research on price transmission in 
transition economies is still limited. Exceptions to this are the following: Tóth in 1999; 
Bojnec and Günther in 2005; Bakucs and Fertő in 2005, 2006; and ﬁ  nally Popovics and Tóth 
2006. Price transmission may be a subject particular to transition countries. This is due to 
pre-1989 distorted markets, poorly developed price-discovery mechanisms and often ad hoc 
policy interventions. Also one might expect transitional economies to have generally larg-
er marketing margins and more pronounced price transmission asymmetries. Furthermore, 
while there is a wealth of literature on livestock markets (beef, lamb, pork, milk2) studies 
on horticultural markets are scarce (Ward, 1982; Worth, 1999; Aguiar and Santana, 2002; 
Hassan and Simioni 2003). Moreover, none of the latter have focused on a transition econo-
my. The paper tries to rectify this problem. 
1  Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, H-1112 Budapest, Budaörsi út 45. 
e-mail: Bakucs@econ.core.hu
2  See e.g. a survey on milk markets by Meszaros and Popovics 200424
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More speciﬁ  cally, the aim of the paper is to investigate marketing margin dynamics 
in selected Hungarian horticultural markets. Section 2 of this paper brieﬂ  y describes the de-
velopment of the Hungarian horticultural chain during the last half decade. Section 3 reviews 
some of the theoretical literature concerning marketing margins and price transmission, while 
section 4 describes the empirical procedures we apply. Our data and results are reported and 
discussed in section 5, with a summary and some conclusions presented in section 6.
2. Hungarian agriculture’s horticultural sector 
This section provides a short description of the Hungarian horticultural chain. 
2.1. Vegetable production
In 2005, 2% of total Hungarian agricultural land was used to produce vegetables. To-
gether with potatoes, the vegetable sector uses around 3 per cent of the available agricultural 
land. Table 1 presents the detailed use of agricultural land in terms of sectors. The potato and 
vegetable sectors’ share of total agricultural land is small (in 2005 0.6 and 2 per cent) and 
there is now a slight downward trend.
Table 1 
Use of agricultural land by sectors (per cent)
Year/Crop 2003 2004 2005
Cereals 68.7 69.9 69.1
Industrial plants 16.2 15.8 17.5
Potatoes 0.8 0.7 0.6
Hay and fodder 6.5 6.2 6.1
Vegetables 2.5 2.3 2.0
Other 5.3 5.1 4.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Agriculture, 2003-2005, Hungarian Central Statistical Ofﬁ  ce, Budapest
The quantity and value of potato and vegetable production does not reﬂ  ect the decline 
in the use of agricultural land (Figure 1).When one considers Hungarian agricultural output, 
it is clear that the vegetable sector’s importance is signiﬁ  cantly larger. In millions of USD 
Table 2 presents the total agricultural output, plant production output, and vegetable sector 
output. Potato production’s share compared to the value of total agricultural output is de-
creasing (1.7 per cent in 2004). However the absolute value of production is ﬂ  uctuating (99 
million USD in 2000 and 140 million USD in 2004). Vegetatable production’s share in total 
agricultural output remains fairly stable at around 10 per cent. 25
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Table 2
The importance of the vegetable sector in total agricultural production

















Total 5,387 100 4,533 100 5,737 100 8,156 100
Plant production 2,570 48 2,196 48 2,650 46 4,757 58
Potatoes 176 3.2 99 2.1 106 1.8 140 1.7
Vegetables 560 10.3 453 10 583 10.1 780 9.5
Source: Own calculations from Statistical Yearbook of Agriculture 1998-2004, Hungarian Central Statistical Of-
ﬁ  ce, Budapest
Figure 1
Production of selected vegetables
Source: stadat-tables http://portal.ksh.hu/portal, accessed June 15, 2006
Of all the vegetables studied in this paper, green peppers are the ones that are most 
exported, and this remains true even though the share of production sold abroad decreased 
from 46 per cent in 2002 to 28 per cent in 2004 (table 3). The import rate for these particular 
vegetables is generally low, the largest percentage compared to production being for carrots 
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Table 3
The ratio of production to foreign trade for selected vegetables (per cent)
2002 2003 2004
Potatoes
Imports / total production 4.3 13.6 7.2
Exports / total production 0.7 2 per cent 0.8
Carrots
Imports / total production 6.4 14.9 8.2
Exports / total production 0.2 0.9 0.1
Tomatoes
Imports / total production 3,0 3,0 4.8
Exports / total production 0.3 0.2 0.1
Green peppers
Imports / total production 6.8 6.5 6.7
Exports / total production  46.3 38.3 27.9
Source: Author’s own calculations from the Statistical Yearbook of Agriculture, 2002-2004, Hungarian Central 
Statistical Ofﬁ  ce, Budapest
Table 4 presents areas sown by agricultural enterprises and areas sown by individual 
farms, and the total sown area for some Hungarian vegetables. From the data comes a pic-
ture of a dual farm structure. In Hungary most vegetables are produced on individual farms 
(69.9 per cent in 2001 and 71.4 per cent in 2005).Tomatoes are exclusively produced on 
individual farms. However, for certain vegetable species the picture is somewhat different. 
In 2005 only 5 hectares of green peppers and 10 hectares of potatoes were produced by 
agricultural enterprises (versus 270 hectares and 3,982 hectares respectively in individual 
farms). An important indicator of the vegetable sector is the area covered with greenhouses 
and walk-in plastic tunnels. 
Table 4










Potatoes 3,815 32,838 3,440 22,462
Tomatoes 601 5,394 817 2,801
Green peppers 248 4,283 124 2,601
Total Vegetables 27,920 62,649 24,845 62,114
* enterprises + co-operatives
Source: The sown area devoted to major crops on arable land, May 31, 2001. The sown area devoted to main crops 
on arable land, May 31, 2005, Hungarian Central Statistical Ofﬁ  ce, Budapest27
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2.2. The processing sector
In Hungary fruit and vegetable processing is the third largest food industry sector, 
producing 10 per cent of the total industry output (excluding tobacco). However, sectoral pri-
vatisation started late, and in the early nineties did not attract foreign capital. In 1994, foreign 
capital’s percentage of total capital in the industry was 72 per cent, increasing to 89 per cent 
in 2000. Therefore, the concentration process was late in coming. C5 (the industry’s ﬁ  ve larg-
est ﬁ  rms) concentration index was only 27 per cent in 1994. However, it went to 53 per cent 
in 1999 and then shrunk slightly to 49 per cent in 2003. Thus C5 concentration in vegetable 
processing has a middle rating compared to other food industry branches. C5 concentration 
has a higher concentration ratio than in wine production or in the bakery industry (29 per 
cent), but a much lower concentration ratio than in sugar, starch, vegetable oil or breweries 
(99-100 per cent). In Hungary the number of fruit and vegetables processing ﬁ  rms was 170 
in 2000 and 191 in 2004.
Table 5
The ratio of production sold for procurement and processors
2002 2003 2004
Potatoes 6 8 7
Carrots 19 26 25.5
Parsley 8 10.5 11
Tomatoes 57 82 44.3
Green peppers 25 40 40
Source: Author’s own calculations from Statistical Yearbook of Agriculture 2002-2004, Hungarian Central Statisti-
cal Ofﬁ  ce, Budapest
Table 5 shows the proportion of vegetable production sold for procurement and 
processing. The importance of the processing industry varies for different types of vegeta-
bles. Tomato producers are the most reliant on the processing industry, selling up to 82 per 
cent (2003) of their production through this marketing channel. Green pepper and carrot 
producers follow with 40 per cent and 25 per cent (2004) of their production sold for procure-
ment and to processors. Parsley and potato growers are at the bottom of the list with only 7 
and 11 per cent (2004) sold for procurement or processing.
2.3. The retail sector
Since the late 1990s the Hungarian food retail sector has been dominated by large, 
mostly foreign owned supermarket chains. However, the small, ‘corner’ shop network hasn’t 
disappeared and retains a relatively high market penetration (69.9 per cent), frequency of 
shopping (35.5 per cent). However, the amount spent per shopping trip is rather low at 
1000 HUF (Fertő et al., 2005). 28
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Table 6
Number of food retail and specialised shops
2002 2003 2004 2005
Non-specialised store with food dominance 36,529 35,963 34,805 33,838
Fruit and vegetable shop 3,389 3,489 3,449 3,324
Source: stadat-tables http://portal.ksh.hu/portal, accessed June 15, 2006
Despite the dominance of large supermarkets and discount stores, there are more than 
33000 non-specialised food stores operating in Hungary. Because of strengthening competi-
tion and increasing concentration, the number of shops is slowly, but constantly decreas-
ing. The number of specialised fruit and vegetable shops increased until 2004, and has been 
gradually decreasing since (Table 6).
3. Theoretical background
The marketing margin is the difference between the retail and the producer or farm 
gate price. It represents marketing costs such as transport, storage, processing, wholesaling, 
retailing, advertising, etc.: 
RP = FP + M  (1)
M, the marketing margin, is composed of an absolute amount and a percentage or 
mark-up of the retail price (Tomek and Robinson, 2003):
M = a + b*RP, where a ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ b < 1.   (2)
If the markets are perfectly competitive, then b = 0, and the margin becomes the con-
stant a, which can be interpreted as the marginal cost3. With the use of logarithmic data, the 
long-run elasticity between the prices is readily available from the marketing margin model. 
If prices are determined at producer level, we use the mark-up model:
lnRP = α1 + εFP lnFP   (3),
where εFP represents price transmission elasticity from the farm price (FP) towards the 
consumer price (RP). If εFP = 1, we have perfect transmission, and thus the mark - up will be 
(eα1 - 1). 0 < εFP < 1 indicates that transmission between the two prices is not perfect. 
If however, prices are determined at consumer level, then the use of the mark-down 
model is appropriate:
lnFP = α2 + εRP lnRP,   (4),
where εRP represents transmission elasticity between the consumer price (RP) and the 
producer price (FP). As before, there is perfect transmissio; if εRP = 1, and the mark - down 
equals (1 - e α2). Imperfect transmission results if εRP > 1. 
3  As Bojnec and Günther (2005) point out, the constant margin might also depend on various other factors 
(e.g. existence of returns to scale, mark-up changes, technological or other input cost changes) beyond the farm 
component of the retail good.29
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A common perception is that reaction to price increases differ from reaction to price 
decreases. More exactly, retailers tend to pass on more rapidly price increases to consumers, 
whilst it takes longer for consumer prices to adjust to producer prices if the latter decrease. 
There are several major explanations for the existence of price asymmetries. First, asym-
metrical price transmission occurs when ﬁ  rms capitalize on quickly changing prices. This 
is explained by the search costs theory (Miller and Hayenga, 2001). This occurs in locally 
imperfect markets, where retailers are able to exercise their local market power. Although 
customers have a number of other choices, it might prove difﬁ  cult to quickly access informa-
tion about other stores’ prices because of search costs. Therefore, although ﬁ  rms can quickly 
raise their retail prices to keep pace with producer price rises, they are much slower to re-
duce retail prices if upstream prices decline. Second comes the problem of perishable goods 
(Ward, 1982). This prevents retailers from raising prices as producer prices rise. Wholesalers 
and retailers with perishable goods may be reluctant to increase prices because they risk a 
lower demand and ultimately being left with the spoiled product. Third, adjustment costs or 
menu costs (Goodwin and Holt, 1999) may underlie asymmetric price adjustments. Menu 
costs involve those costs occurring with re-pricing and adoption of a new pricing strategy. 
As with perishable goods, menu costs also prevent retailers from changing prices. Finally, 
the exercise of oligopoly power can encourage asymmetric price transmission. It appears in 
markets with highly inelastic demand and concentrated supply; many food chains have such 
market organisation characteristics. It is necessary to state that in the long run such collusive 
behaviour is rather difﬁ  cult to maintain, because of the incentive for one ﬁ  rm to cheat the 
others (Miller and Hayenga, 2001, p. 554). Recent papers have endeavoured to establish the 
link between price transmission and market power. Using a formal theoretical model Weld-
egebriel (2004) evaluated the impact of oligopsony power on the degree of price transmis-
sion. By using as a benchmark the degree of price transmission in a perfectly competitive 
market, Weldegebriel showed that oligopoly and oligopsony power do not necessarily lead 
to imperfect price transmission. Although in some cases this does occur. Indeed, they may 
counteract each other’s impact on the degree of price transmission. The outcomes depend on 
the functional forms for retail demand and farm supply.
4. Empirical procedure 
Over time most macroeconomic time series are not stationary, i.e. they contain unit 
roots. Over time their mean and variance are not constant. If one utilizes the standard clas-
sical estimation methods (OLS), statistical inference can result in biased estimates and/or 
spurious regressions. In the pertinent literature there are a large number of unit root tests4 
available (see Maddala and Kim, 1998 for a comprehensive review). 
Even though many individual time series contain stochastic trends (i.e. they are not 
stationary at levels), in the long run many of them tend to move together, suggesting the 
existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship. Two or more non-stationary variables are 
cointegrated if there are one or more linear combinations of the stationary variables. This 
implies that the stochastic trends of the variables are linked over time, moving towards the 
same long-term equilibrium. 
4 Consider  the  ﬁ  rst order autoregressive process, AR(1):
yt = ρyt-1 + et, t =…,-1,0,1,2,…, where et is white noise.
The process is considered stationary if |ρ| < 1, thus testing for stationarity is equivalent with testing for unit roots 
(ρ = 1).  Rewriting to obtain:
Δyt = δyt-1 + et, where δ = 1 - ρ, the test becomes: 
H0: δ = 0 against the alternative H1: δ < 0.30
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4.1 Testing for unit roots
Maddala and Kim (1998) argued that because of size distortions and poor power prob-
lems associated with the commonly used Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests, it is pref-
erable to use the DF-GLS unit root test, derived by Elliott, Rothenberg and Stock (1996). 
With structural breaks in the time series, the unit root tests might lead one to incor-
rectly conclude that there is actually a unit root, when in fact the series are stationary with a 
break. Several unit root tests were developed to handle the problem. The Perron (1997) test 
performs an endogenous search for the breakpoints by computing the t-statistics for all pos-
sible breakpoints, then choosing the breakpoint selected by the smallest t-statistic, meaning 
the least favourable one for the null hypothesis. 
4.2 Cointegration analysis
The two most widely used cointegration tests are the Engle-Granger two-step method 
(Engle and Granger, 1987) and Johansen’s multivariate approach (Johansen, 1988). The Jo-
hansen cointegration procedure is based on estimating the following Vector Error Correction 
Model (VECM):
ΔZt = Г1ΔZt-1 + ... + Гk-1ΔZt-k+1 + ΠZt-k + ut  5),
where Zt = [RPt, RPt]’, a (2 x 1) vector containing the retail and farm prices, both 
integrated of order one, Γ1 ,….Γk+1 are (2x2) vectors of the short-run parameters, Π is (2x2) 
matrix of the long-run parameters, ut is the white noise stochastic term.
Π = αβ’ (6),
where matrix α represents the speed of adjustment to disequilibrium and β is a matrix 
which represents up to (n - 1) cointegrating relationships between the non-stationary vari-
ables. Trace and maximum Eigen-value statistics are used to test for cointegration. Once (5) 
is estimated we can proceed to test for weak exogeneity tests. The terms of vector α (factor 
loading matrix) measure the speed at which the variables adjust towards the long-run equi-
librium after a price shock. The α vector of the weakly exogenous variable equals zero. To 
ﬁ  nd the direction of the Granger causality between the two price series, restrictions are tested 
on the α vectors. If however, the true data generating process contains various regime shifts, 
then the Johansen test is likely not to reject the no-cointegration null hypothesis. 
Gregory and Hansen (1996) introduce a methodology to test for the null hypothesis 
of no-cointegration against the cointegration alternative with structural breaks. Under the 
alternative 3 models are considered. Model 2 comes with a change in the intercept:
RPt = μ1 + μ2φtτ + αTFPt + et , t = 1, … , n. (7)
Model 3 is similar to model 2, only contains a time trend:
RPt = μ1 + μ2φtτ + βt + αTFPt + et , t = 1, … , n. (8)
Finally, model 4 allows a structural change both in the intercept and the slope:
RPt = μ1 + μ2φtτ + αT
1 FPt + αT
2 FPt φtτ+ et , t = 1, … , n. (9)
Because usually the time of the break is not a priori known, models (7) – (9) are esti-31
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mated recursively allowing T to vary between the middle 70% of the sample:
| 0.15n | ≤ T ≤ | 0.85n |
For each possible breakpoint, the ADF statistics corresponding to the residuals of 
models (7) – (9) are computed, then the smallest value is chosen as the test statistic (as it is 
the most favourable regarding rejection of the null). Critical values are non-standard, and are 
tabulated by Gregory and Hansen (1996). 
4.3 Asymmetrical error correction representation
Most asymmetry analysis uses the following Ward (1982) speciﬁ  cation, which is 
based on an earlier Woffram (1971) and Houck (1977) speciﬁ  cation:
  (10)
Here, the ﬁ  rst differences of the producer prices are split into increasing and decreas-
ing phases by the D- and D+ dummy variables. Asymmetry is tested using a standard F-test to 
determine whether βj
+ and βj
- are signiﬁ  cantly different.
These approaches do not take into consideration the data’s time series properties and 
many of them suffer serial autocorrelation that usually suggests spurious regression.
With the development of cointegration techniques, attempts were made to test asym-
metry in a cointegration framework. Von Cramon-Taubadel (1998) demonstrated that the 
Wolffram-Houck type speciﬁ  cations are fundamentally inconsistent with cointegration and 
proposed an error correction model of the form:
  (11).
The error correction term, (ECTt), is in fact the long-run (cointegration) relationship’s 
residual:
ECTt-1 = μt-1= RPt-1 – λ0 – λ1 FPt-1 ; λ0 and λ1 are coefﬁ  cients. The error correction term 






Using VECM representation as in (11), both the short-run and the long-run symmetry 
hypothesis can hence be tested using standard tests. Valid inference requires one price to be 
mildly exogenous regarding both the long and short run with respect to the parameters in (11). 32
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5. Price transmission analysis in the Hungarian vegetable sector
Due to processors’ and/or retailers’ market power, it is usually assumed that farmers 
have no inﬂ  uence on producer prices, meaning food processors and retailers use their market 
power to gain the upper hand against farmers. In order to obtain further information on sup-
ply chain participants in speciﬁ  c product markets, it is necessary to analyse price transmis-
sion. Price transmission is the process where price information ﬂ  ows through the marketing 
chain in a given direction, and it is transformed through the various economic players’ inﬂ  u-
ence in the market. It is quite common for various producer and consumer support groups 
to contend that asymmetrical price transmission characterizes agricultural and food markets. 
This perceived asymmetry is usually considered disadvantageous for both consumers and 
producers. The idea is that food processors, wholesalers, and retailers tend to quickly pass on 
producer price increases to consumers, while price decreases are only transmitted slowly and 
sequentially. 51 monthly producer and retail price observations conducted between January 
2002 and March 2006 are used for the analysis. The nominal price data provided by the Hun-
garian Statistical Ofﬁ  ce was deﬂ  ated to January 2002 in terms of the Hungarian consumer 
price index. Figures 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 present producer and retail price evolution for the selected 
vegetables and potatoes.
Figure 2 
Producer and retail prices of carrots at constant prices 
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Figure 3
Producer and retail prices of parsley at constant prices
Source: Own calculations based on stadat-tables http://portal.ksh.hu/portal, accessed June 15, 2006
Figure 4
Tomato producer and retail prices at constant prices
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Figure 5
Green pepper producer retail prices at constant prices
Source: Author’s own calculations based on stadat-tables http://portal.ksh.hu/portal, accessed June 15, 2006
Figure 6
Potato producer and retail prices at constant prices
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As expected, seasonality plays a major role in determining the producer and, to some 
extent, retail prices. Except for potato and perhaps parsley prices (Figure 3 and 6), prices for 
all other products included in this paper exhibit seasonal patterns. Seasonality is especially 
obvious for the tomato and green pepper markets (Figure 4 and 5). Graphical examination 
of green pepper prices indicates that producer and retail prices increase and decrease simul-
taneously, resulting in a relatively constant marketing margin, and this trend suggests price 
transmission symmetry. However, Figure 4 indicates that large drops in tomato producer 
prices are typically followed by much smaller decreases in retail prices while producer price 
increases instantly appear at the retail level. A priori this indicates asymmetrical price trans-
mission in the tomato market. 
For reliable results formal analysis is needed and this requires the use of recent time 
series econometrics innovations. Unit root tests on the selected vegetables’ deﬂ  ated producer 
and retail prices reveal that all price series except those for carrots are non-stationary. There-
fore we in turn apply cointegration and Vector Error Correction methods to analyse the pro-
ducer-retail price transmission for potatoes, parsley, tomatoes and green pepper prices. Table 
7 presents the results of the cointegration analysis for the non-stationary price pairs. 
Table 7

















r = 0 *19.57 20.26 *14.16 15.80
r = 1 5.40 9.16 5.40 9.16
Tomato prices 0
r = 0 28.13 20.26 22.34 15.80
r = 1 5.79 9.16 5.79 9.16
Green pepper prices 1
r = 0 28.13 20.26 24.29 15.89
r = 1 5.79 9.16 7.76 9.16
* Signiﬁ  cant at 10%
Notes: 11 seasonal dummies were included to account for seasonality
Because after using the Johansen method non-stationary, potato prices did not cointe-
grate, we used the Gregory and Hansen (1996) procedure to seek cointegration with possible 
structural breaks. The method identiﬁ  ed the cointegrating relationship with a structural break 
that transpired in June 20045, which was similar to equation 7. Since carrot prices are station-
ary, they were analysed using OLS methods. Slightly exogenous prices (i.e. those that not 
adjusting to the long-run equilibrium in the advent of exogenous shock) were brought about 
from cointegration analysis. With slightly exogenous prices within the context of cointegra-
tion analysis, Granger direction causality is instantly determined. The Vector Error Correc-
tion Models (equation 11) and the Vector Autoregressive Model (for the stationary carrot 
prices) are estimated next. Table 8 illustrates the result of the short and long-run symmetry 
tests. 
5  The recursively estimated ADF test statistic is – 6.60, rejecting the no-cointegration null hypothesis at 5% level 
of signiﬁ  cance36
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Table 8
Short and log-run price transmission symmetry tests


























* Signiﬁ  cant at 1%
Of the ﬁ  ve vegetable prices, only tomato prices reject both the symmetrical price 
transmission null-hypothesis on a short and long-run basis. Table 9 presents estimates regard-
ing transmission elasticity, and a price causality price summary (the dominant market levels 
that determine industry prices), and long and short-run price transmission. Generally, com-
petitive pricing supposes that transmission elasticity equals 1, and the prices on two market 
levels are only linked by a constant absolute margin. 
Table 9
Elasticity, causality and price transmission results 








0.75 0.70 2.40 4.10
Price causality FP → RP FP → RP FP → RP RP → FP RP → FP
Long-run transmission symmetric - symmetric asymmetric symmetric
Short-run transmission  symmetric symmetric symmetric asymmetric symmetric
* A structural break occurred in June 2004, which reduced both prices, but increased the margin.
Despite a dual farm structure which is dominated by small individual farmers, price 
determination ﬂ  ows from the producer to the retail level for potatoes, parsley and carrots. 
This indicates that farmers do not simply accept prices but also can inﬂ  uence market prices. 
Tomato and green pepper prices reveal signiﬁ  cant seasonality, rather large transmission elas-
ticities, and causality ﬂ  owing from the retail to the producer level. Therefore, tomato and 
green pepper producers tend to accept rather than determine prices, and industry prices are 
determined by downstream market levels (processors, wholesalers, retailers). These results 
are in line with table 5 data revealing that vegetable producers (whose production is largely 
sold for procurement and processing) are more dependent on downstream industries and can-
not inﬂ  uence prices. For all vegetables in this study short-run price transmission is symmet-
ric, but in the tomato market long-run price transmission is asymmetric. It therefore follows 
that the tomato market is not competitive and efﬁ  cient and thus processors, wholesalers and 
retailers can exercise market power, and instantly transmit producer price increases while 
only slowly and partially transmitting producer price decreases. 37
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6. Conclusions
The paper investigated the long-term relationship between retail prices and the farm-
gate price for Hungarian carrots, parsley, tomatoes, green peppers and potatoes where pro-
duction structure tends to be dominated by small-scale farmers. The fragmented production 
structure may have deeper implications for the performance of the horticultural sector. How-
ever, its impact on price transmission from the producer to the retail level seems limited. 
Farmers producing tomatoes and green peppers accept rather than determine prices, and only 
the tomato market presents price transmission asymmetries. Not surprisingly these markets 
are characterised by a high share of production sold for processing, perhaps enabling proces-
sors to exercise their market power. Seasonality affects most products analyzed, especially 
tomato and green pepper prices both at the producer and the retail level. Our results (ex-
cept for the tomato chain) correspond with those of previous research investigating price 
transmission in the vegetable chain. Worth (1999) concluded that four of the six vegetable 
products studied do not present reveal transmission asymmetries, Hassan and Simioni (2003) 
conducted a detailed analysis of price transmission in the French vegetable sector, but their 
results do not conﬁ  rm the belief that middlemen are able to exercise market power and proﬁ  t 
from ﬂ  uctuating producer/retail prices. However, Ward (1982) analysed the United States 
vegetable market with pre-cointegration methods, and found positive price transmission 
asymmetries, meaning producer price decreases are passed on more quickly and more com-
pletely to retail prices than producer price decreases. Due to a lack of other price transmission 
studies regarding vegetable chains in transition economies, we may only compare the results 
with other product chains. Price transmission analysis for the pork (Bakucs and Fertő, 2005), 
and beef (Bakucs and Fertő, 2006) sectors also concluded that even though the production 
system is fragmented, producer/retail price transmission is symmetric. 
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